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Abstract 
Introduction 
Poor medicines management places patients at risk, particularly during care transitions. For 
patients with heart failure (HF), optimal medicines management is crucial to control 
symptoms and prevent hospital readmission. This study explored the concept of resilience 
using HF as an example condition to understand how the system compensates for known 
and unknown weaknesses. 
 
Methods  
We explored resilience using a mixed-methods approach in four healthcare economies in the 
north of England. Data from hospital site observations, healthcare staff and patient 
interviews, and documentary analysis were collected between June 2016 and March 2017. 
Data were synthesised and analysed using framework analysis. 
 
Results 
Interviews were conducted with 45 healthcare professionals, with 20 patients at three time-
points and 189 hours of observation were undertaken. We identified four primary inter-
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related themes concerning organisational resilience. These were named as gaps, traps, 
bridges and props. Gaps were discontinuities in processes that had the potential to result in 
poorly optimised medicines. Traps were features of the system that could produce errors or 
unintended adverse medication events. ‘Bridges’ were features of the medicines 
management system that promoted safety and continuity which ensured that, despite 
varying conditions, care could be delivered successfully. ‘Props’ were informal, temporary or 
impromptu actions taken by patients or healthcare staff to avoid potential adverse events.  
 
Conclusion 
The numerous opportunities for HF patient safety to be compromised and sub-optimal 
medicines management during this common care transition are mitigated by system 
resilience. Cross-organisational bridges and temporary fixes or ‘props’ put in place by 
patients and carers, healthcare teams and organisations are critical for safe and optimal care 
to be delivered in the face of continued system pressures. 
 
 
Strengths and limitations of the study 
• Using four geographical areas and mixed methods, this study explores medicines 
management for people with heart failure at a time of considerable risk. 
 
• Multiple viewpoints of patients and staff highlighted how the system is resilient in the 
face of pressure and weaknesses. 
 
• The study presents a framework within which to explore and understand resilience in 
healthcare systems: that of ‘bridges’ and ‘props’ set against a backdrop of ‘gaps’ and 
‘traps’.   
 
• The study collected multiple viewpoints but did not include the perspectives of local, 
regional and national policy makers. 
 
• The patients and staff who agreed to be interviewed may have had particularly 
positive or negative experiences of the system, although their accounts were 
augmented and triangulated by first-hand independent observations. 
 
Introduction 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) views the safe management of medicines as a global 
challenge.1 In the UK, guidance stresses the importance of improving the way medicines are 
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managed at care transitions, such as admission to and discharge from hospital.2 However, 
there is continued evidence that systems managing medicines are not optimally calibrated, 
particularly during and after hospital discharge,3 when the responsibility for patient care 
shifts across organisations and clinicians.4   
 
Medicines management is a system that supports the therapeutic use of medicines by 
patients, involving multiple healthcare organisations and staff with different clinical 
specialties and professional roles.5 There is no shortage of evidence about the points at 
which healthcare systems fail to provide safe care.6-9 Patients are not always well prepared 
to leave hospital and self-manage their ongoing treatment.10 The effective transfer of 
sufficient and accurate information between healthcare organisations remains inadequate in 
many cases4 and is compounded by boundaries between care providers who may not 
always have access to the same information about patients’ health. It is then unsurprising 
that discrepancies arise between medicines lists held by different care providers and 
patients.3 11 12  
 
Heart failure (HF) is a chronic progressive condition affecting 900,000 individuals in the UK 
and is projected to rise significantly with an ageing population.13 HF is the second most 
costly condition for the NHS after stroke and is characterised by high rates of 
readmissions.14 Heart failure symptoms and disease progression can be controlled through 
well managed medicines; however, guidelines for their use are not always applied and 
cardiology medicines can also cause harm, such as kidney injury, if they are not monitored.15 
Hence, the optimal management of medicines when leaving hospital is crucial to enhance 
quality of life, manage symptoms, prevent deterioration leading to hospital readmission, and 
reduce mortality.16  
 
Current thinking in patient safety has shifted focus from the deconstruction of events leading 
up to safety incidents (Safety I) to a more positive and proactive view of healthcare systems 
that identifies and values what goes right as well as pinpointing what goes wrong (Safety 
II).17 18 Thus Safety II focuses on preventing error whilst accepting that there is variability in 
the delivery of healthcare, acknowledging that patients do not always experience harm as a 
consequence of their care. Instead of reacting when things go wrong, organisations 
proactively anticipate developments, negative as well as positive. It offers recognition of 
good performance in the face of uncertainty, valuing flexibility, adaptability, foresight and 
knowledge of how systems operate.17 19 This in turn promotes a more dynamic attitude to 
performance through resilience which is the ability for a system and the individuals therein to 
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adjust prior to, during, or following changes or disturbances or in the face of ongoing, 
sustained pressure.18 20-22   
 
This concept of resilience in healthcare has looked at specific points in the patient pathway 
such as handover of care between staff in one location such as a ward or performing specific 
roles, 19 23 24 but not at a point of transition between healthcare organisations. Moreover only 
one previous study has explored how patients can enhance resilience in medicines 
management at and after hospital discharge through anticipating discrepancies and taking 
remedial action.25 No studies to date have explored resilience in medicines management at 
this care transition from multiple perspectives, including staff and patients and across 
different healthcare economies. 
 
This study aimed to address this evidence gap by systematically investigating resilience in 
the medicines management system, using HF as an example condition. More specifically, 
the study was designed to understand how the system compensates for weaknesses and 
maximises opportunities in order to deliver safe yet optimal treatment. Its objectives were to 
explore the system of medicines management in multiple healthcare economies to highlight 
where resilience exists and identify where improvements to the system can be made to 
enhance resilience.  
 
Methods 
We used a mixed-methods design in four healthcare economies and their local primary care 
organisations (one comprising two hospitals and three comprising one hospital) in the north 
of England. Sites were selected to include University teaching hospitals and non-University 
teaching hospitals in different areas. Data from site observations, staff and patient qualitative 
interviews, and documentary analysis (discharge letters and organisational and national 
policies) were collected between June 2016 and March 2017. NHS research ethics 
committee approval was sought and granted (16/NS/0018).  
 
Patient involvement 
A patient researcher was a member of the research team advising on patient recruitment, 
data collection materials and information and consent forms. The research was overseen by 
a patient-led steering group including people with heart failure and carers. 
 
Data Collection 
 
Observations 
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Following ward-level consent, three experienced health researchers (BF, HI, IM) conducted 
a total of 189 hours of observations in five cardiology wards and one heart failure clinic. 
Structured observation schedules developed by the research team informed by previous 
work26 were used to record observations. We observed medicines and ward rounds, 
preparation of information for discharge, patient discharges, as well as any other impromptu 
medicines-related activities. Unstructured, contemporaneous field notes were taken by the 
researchers.  
 
Patient recruitment 
A quota sample of 4-6 patients in each site was constructed, aiming for at least 16 complete 
datasets in total in the four areas. Patients were recruited during hospital admission by 
research nurses in consultation with ward staff. Patients were eligible for the study if they 
were aged 18 years or older, had capacity to consent, and had been admitted to hospital 
with a diagnosis of heart failure with reduced ejection fraction (<45%) measured by an 
echocardiogram within the last five years. Patients also needed to present New York Heart 
Association (NYHA) Class III symptoms.27 Research nurses approached eligible patients to 
introduce the study. Patients were then provided with a participant information leaflet and 
given the opportunity to ask questions about the study; they were given at least four hours to 
decide whether or not to take part. 
 
Patient interviews 
Patients’ experiences with their medicines were explored at three time points: at, or as soon 
as practicable, after discharge (covering experience from admission to discharge) and then  
approximately two and six weeks later. The research team developed a semi-structured 
interview schedule built upon previous work26 and a review of relevant literature. The 
schedule comprised questions relating to patients’ experiences with their medicines, and 
prompts and probes were used when relevant. Two researchers conducted the interviews 
(BF, HI). Interviews lasted up to 60 minutes, took place in patients’ homes and were video or 
audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
 
Healthcare staff recruitment 
Healthcare professionals with a role in medicines management in primary or secondary care 
were approached to take part in a semi-structured interview either by research nurses or the 
study team, using face-to-face communication or by e-mail invitation. A range of healthcare 
professionals involved in medicines management were selected following ward 
observations. 
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Healthcare staff interviews 
An interview schedule was developed by the research team, to explore staff perceptions of 
safe medicines management. The schedule focused on medicines management processes, 
staff views on its quality and effectiveness for patients with heart failure in primary and 
secondary care, and their experiences of medicines management at discharge from 
secondary to primary care. Staff were given a participant information leaflet describing the 
study and, if they agreed to take part, an appointment was made to conduct the interview. 
Interviews lasted up to 60 minutes, were audio-recorded following written consent and 
transcribed verbatim.  
 
Analysis of key documents 
Documents were identified and reviewed including: national guidance on medicines 
optimisation used in the hospital setting;2 local policies on medicines management and 
discharge in the four health economies; case notes and communications such as discharge 
letters, and any patient information about medicines in use in the four hospitals and available 
as text. Examples of potential system resilience at care transitions and risks in the system 
were identified and using a framework that mapped them according to the point in the 
transition to which they related and to the resilience element (or lack of) they evidenced.19 
 
Data analysis 
The process of data analysis was iterative and comparative: analysing the first round of 
interview and observation data as further interviews and observations were undertaken; 
providing the opportunity to explore emerging themes in greater detail in subsequent 
fieldwork. The research team met several times both during and following data collection to 
discuss the data synthesis and analysis method and the emerging themes. Interview data 
were synthesised through data extraction with the data from observations and documents 
and the combined data were analysed using the Framework approach,28 involving detailed 
familiarisation with the data, identifying themes, interpreting the findings within the context of 
similar research studies, and considering policy and practice.  
 
Results 
A total of 56 interviews with 20 heart failure patients were conducted: 19 at discharge or 
shortly afterwards (timepoint 1); 19 approximately two weeks after discharge (timepoint 2); 
and 18 approximately six weeks after discharge (timepoint 3). We were unable to contact 
one patient from site 1 at time-point 1; at site 2 one patient withdrew from the study after the 
first interview. One patient from Site 3 was not interviewed at the third time-point due to 
hospital readmission, and at site 4 one patient was too ill to continue after the second 
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interview. Table 1 presents the number of patients interviewed for each site at the different 
time points. Table 2 outlines the gender and age of interviewed patients. 
 
Table 1: The number of patients interviewed at each time-point by site 
Site Timepoint 1 Timepoint 2 Timepoint 3 
Site 1 2 3 3 
Site 2 5 4 4 
Site 3 6 6 5 
Site 4 6 6 5 
Total 19 19 18 
 
Table 2: The gender and age of patients who took part in interviews 
Site Gender Total Age range 
Site 
1 
Male 2 72-82 
Female 1 53 
Site 
2 
Male 5 40-89 
Female 0 0 
Site 
3 
Male 5 46-79 
Female 1 69 
Site 
4 
Male 4 46-78 
Female 2 69-76 
 
Forty-five interviews (Table 3) were conducted with healthcare professionals: 19 with primary 
care staff (15 in four GP surgeries, two community pharmacists and two community HF 
nurses) and 26 with secondary care staff. Table 4 presents the number of healthcare staff 
interviewed by site.  
 
 
 
Table 3: Number of interviews by healthcare staff type 
Staff Type Number of interviews 
GPs 4 
Practice administrators / data quality managers 2 
Practice pharmacists 3 
Practice nurses 1 
Practice managers 3 
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Community pharmacists  2 
Community heart failure nurses 2 
Clinical care co-ordinators 1 
Community cardiac nurses 1 
Cardiologists 3 
Ward managers 5 
Staff nurses 2 
Junior sisters 1 
Ward pharmacists 3 
Specialist cardiology pharmacists 2 
Consultant pharmacists 1 
Junior doctors 2 
Specialist heart failure nurses 3 
Ward administrative staff 4 
Total 45 
 
 
Table 4: The number of healthcare staff interviewed per site 
Site Primary/community care Secondary care 
Site 1 6 7 
Site 2 4 8 
Site 3 2 4 
Site 4 7 7 
Total 19 26 
We identified four primary inter-related themes concerning organisational resilience and 
termed these: gaps, traps, bridges and props. Examples representing each theme are 
shown in Tables 5-8.  
 
‘Gaps’ were defined as a discontinuity in key processes that form the medicines 
management system and had the potential to result in poorly optimised medicines. 
Approaches to preparing discharge information varied across sites, with information 
sometimes being missed due to a lack of preparation time. Gaps were also evident in the 
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information shared with primary care and in the preparation of patients to use their 
medicines. For the latter, we identified no standardised processes for informing patients 
about their medicines and, while hospital policies stipulated that patients should be informed, 
and gave details of the types of information patients should have, there was no guidance on 
optimal methods for informing patients about their medicines or training, so patients’ 
experiences of receiving medicines were inconsistent and information was deficient for 
some. 
 
Discussions with some nurses during observations revealed that while they were 
aware of policies in place on what aspects to cover when discussing medicines with 
patients at discharge, they did not follow them and often rushed these conversations 
[Site 2 - Field notes from ward observations] 
  
After discharge we found gaps in the continuity of care, for example not all patients had a 
community pharmacy Medicines Use Review (MUR) because pharmacies did not routinely 
receive information about the patients’ medicines at discharge. Waiting times for specialist 
staff follow-up varied considerably and were sometimes lengthy, for example waiting times 
for an appointment with community heart failure specialist nurses who would manage 
medicines titration was sometimes as long as three months after discharge.  
 
We defined ‘traps’ as features of the way the medicines management system was designed 
or managed that might produce medication errors defined as a ‘failure in the treatment 
process that leads to, or has the potential to lead to, harm to the patient’.29 30 or unintended 
adverse medication events. These were evident in the co-ordination of discharges, for 
example the pressure on ward staff to expedite discharges as quickly as possible appeared 
to impact on the effective preparation of discharge information and on educating patients 
about their discharge medicines. 
 
If you’re busy, you’ll write less and I think that’s just what happens on the job.  If I 
know I’ve got time, I’ll make sure I input as much detail as possible, but if you’re busy 
you just don’t have the time to do that, so you’ll just really do short summaries and 
just include the bare essentials. (Site 1 FY1 doctor) 
 
Staff preparing discharge information were often interrupted, could not always locate 
patients’ notes and none reported receiving training about safe practices with medicines at 
discharge to primary care. We also found error traps after discharge, such as a lack of time 
and resources in GP surgeries to process discharge information. Finally, there was evidence 
that patients’ lack of knowledge about the purpose of their medicines could potentially cause 
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confusion particularly when the changes made in hospital led patients to have different 
supplies or multiple multi-compartment ‘compliance aid’ tablet boxes. Like hospital staff, 
none of the primary care staff had received formal training about safe practices with 
medicines at discharge to primary care. 
 
‘Bridges’ were identified as formalised features of the medicines management system that 
had been made permanent and promoted the safety and continuity of medicines 
management. They ensured that, despite varying conditions, care could be delivered 
successfully to heart failure patients. 
 
When preparing the "To Take Home" medicines at discharge, ward staff wait for the 
pharmacist to come to the ward to check the patients' medicines lists and ensure 
these are accurate and any errors can be rectified. [Site 2 - Field notes from ward 
observations] 
 
Bridges also included methods of communicating with primary care about treatment, for 
example, when hospitals sent an electronic copy of the patient’s discharge summary to their 
general practitioner (GP). In this case, summaries were put together by multidisciplinary 
teams including junior doctors, nurses and pharmacists who would check and add 
information about medicines that would be useful to the primary care team. After discharge, 
two participating hospital trusts ran pharmacist-led titration clinics to ensure that medicine 
doses were optimised. Titration clinics also meant patients would be seen more quickly than 
if they had to see a consultant cardiologist. One cardiology pharmacist explained that the 
titration clinic ensured patients’ medicines were adjusted as and when appropriate, in light of 
some GPs not feeling confident about changing them.  
 
GP practices differed in how they processed discharge information. In one practice, 
administrative staff would review the discharge summary and forward actions to practice 
staff if medicines information needed to be changed. In another practice, this task was the 
responsibility of the GP, who would forward actions to practice staff and book any tests 
needed as a consequence of any changes in medicines occurring during hospital stay (i.e. 
blood tests). One GP reported that his practice had re-engineered their processing of 
discharge summaries to include a multidisciplinary team comprising administrative staff, a 
practice-based pharmacist (whose post was created in response to recognised safety risks) 
and GPs, with the pharmacist taking responsibility for coordinating the process. 
 
“And so [processing discharge summaries] it was in-between surgeries, it was at the 
end of  the day, so it was being fitted in rather than having allocated time, so naturally 
when it’s being fitted in the process is a bit more rushed, you’re more under pressure, 
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maybe your concentration levels aren't there, so mistakes can be easily made. So as 
a practice we made the decision that just in terms of a workload thing and also 
patient safety and efficiency it would be worth investing in sort of pharmacy services.“ 
[GP, Site 1] 
 
Practice pharmacists perceived that their specialist knowledge improved as a consequence 
of being involved in the discharge process, while further expediting the safe management of 
medicines for patients after discharge. Some practice staff described having targets in place 
linked to time taken to process discharge summaries, with some practices prioritising 
processing driven by the risk of readmission. One data quality manager explained that they 
tried to process discharges within 24 hours of receiving information from the hospital, 
including reconciling medicines, but also explained that they had a maximum of a week to 
complete it. 
 
“So we have a week turnaround in order to get any meds reconciliation done. We 
generally get our electronic discharge normally within 24 hours of the patient being 
discharged, that would be scanned through the system that will then go to the doctor, 
the doctor will then forward it to me generally for coding and also to our practice 
pharmacist.” [Data quality manager, Site 2] 

‘Props’ were informal, temporary or impromptu actions taken by patients or healthcare staff 
to avoid potential adverse events, such as medication errors. Props were sometimes 
developed in response to risks in the working environment, such as interruptions during 
medicines rounds. 
 
During medicines rounds, nurses are frequently interrupted whilst sorting patients' 
medicines. One nurse observed also uses the strategy of signing the drug chart soon 
as one medicine is sorted into the plastic cup before moving to the next medicine. If 
there are interruptions, the nurse will know which medicines have already been 
sorted by looking at the drug chart. The nurse says it is a brilliant strategy to ensure 
accuracy and safety and cope with inevitable distractions and interruptions [Site 1, 
Field notes from ward observations] 
 
Hospital staff told us that they suspected recommendations made by the hospital (for 
example the up-titration of doses which is critical in HF) may not be acted on in primary care. 
Hence, staff created solutions to prevent a break in the ongoing treatment, giving patients an 
extra copy of their discharge letter to take to the GP. Some staff members described being 
cognisant of how discharge information can be difficult for patients to understand and would 
take extra time to explain the discharge summary and any abbreviations contained within it. 
One staff nurse at Site 1 described having to make protected time to hold these discussions 
with patients, drawing curtains around the patients’ beds to prevent any disruption. Some 
patients reported being discharged with an insufficient amount of medicines, leading them to 
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seek community pharmacists help to provide them with emergency supplies until they could 
see a GP. Some patients also proactively provided the necessary links between community 
pharmacy, general practitioners and the hospital after discharge. For example, one patient 
called the community pharmacy to ask what information, if any, they had been provided with 
about his medicines. Another patient provided their GP practice with information about dose 
changes. 
 
So when I’d run out, I rang my GP and they were blissfully unaware of any changes to 
the amount, the receptionist had to take it down.  She says “well what was you on?” 
and I said “well I was on one tablet a day and then they took me down to half, then 
they put me to one tablet a day again and now I’m on two tablets a day” “Two 
tablets?”, this is the receptionist’s questions.  I says “yeah, two tablets.”  [Patient 05, 
Site 4, interview 2] 
 
 Finally, community pharmacists stepped in to organise supplies for patients when 
something had gone wrong and the patient was unable to get the correct medicines. 
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Table 5: Gaps at and after hospital discharge 
  
At discharge After discharge 
Gaps 
 
Discussions about medicines at discharge can be rushed, due to time pressures and workload. 
 
Community pharmacy is not integrated into communication about discharge 
medicines  
No standard process or guidance on how to hold discussions with patients about medicines 
 
Patients are not routinely referred to community pharmacy for follow-up support 
Limited or no formal training about care transitions, preparing discharge summaries or patients to use 
medicines for all staff 
 
Limitations to the extent of shared IT systems between primary and secondary 
care and between surgeries and pharmacies 
Processes for preparing patients to go home with medicines are linear but not streamlined, for example 
multiple staff members need to input which causes delays 
 
Not all surgeries have a practice pharmacist to reconcile medicines 
Discharge summary information is technical and uses jargon and abbreviations which are difficult for 
patients to understand 
 
Long waiting times to access community heart failure nurse services (up to 12 
weeks) 
Inconsistency in level of detail in information written on discharge summary due to workload and 
healthcare staff  knowledge of the patient 
 
Some patients perceive limitations in post-hospital follow-up care, including 
difficulty in accessing services in primary care 
Varying information offered to patients about follow-up appointments 
 
Patients are not fully aware of the roles and skills of primary care staff, 
particularly community pharmacists 
Limited awareness among staff about policies in place for medicines management 
 
Some patients unable to devise effective strategies to self-manage medicines at 
home 
 
Effectiveness of discharge are not critically appraised due to lack of feedback (unless the patient is  
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readmitted or primary care staff make queries) 
 
Table 6: Traps at and after hospital discharge 
  
At Discharge After discharge 
Traps Patient knowledge of medicines when they are discharged is limited Community pharmacy does not routinely receive copies of patients' discharge summaries so cannot correct 
or query new GP prescriptions 
There is pressure on ward staff to discharge patients and free-up beds Patients have an on-going lack of knowledge of their medicines once home 
Variation in ward staffing levels and varying numbers of discharges to 
perform each day 
No formal training for surgery staff to process discharge information 
Use of several different IT systems in producing information for discharge Lack of time and resources in surgery to process discharge information 
Staff preparing patients for discharge and information about discharge 
medicines are interrupted 
Systems allow old prescriptions to be issued when medicines have changed  
Preparing information for discharge routinely left to junior members of staff 
who may not be familiar with the patient 
Dosages are monitored and changed by staff in different organisations  
Conversations about medicines with patients at discharge can be left to the 
last minute 
Trust in healthcare professionals may lead to a lack of critical appraisal of one's condition and medicines 
Patients transferred to discharge lounges to await medicines face an extra 
transfer of care 
Changes in medicines lead to patients having conflicting medicines and multi compartment compliance aid 
boxes at home 
  Varying levels of communication across care organisations results in extra burden to patient who has to fill 
in the gaps 
  Varying information about medicines changes provided to primary care may lead to healthcare staff having 
to make decisions based on assumptions 
  Healthcare professions may not accept treatment recommendation by other healthcare professionals (e.g. 
GP not accepting recommendations made by HFSN) 
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Table 7: Bridges at and after discharge 
  
At discharge After discharge 
Bridges Hospitals have established methods of communicating about patients' treatment with 
primary care 
Some trusts provide outpatient clinics where patients can receive IV fluids, thus avoiding 
them to need to be admitted to receive these medicines or speeding up discharges 
Preparing discharge summaries and To Take Out (TTO) lists is a multidisciplinary task 
involving nurses and pharmacists 
GP practices have systems for acting upon discharge information once it is received, 
although processes and times to process this information vary 
Ward pharmacists can expedite well managed discharge through proactively creating 
TTO lists 
Some practices have targets in place linked to time to process discharge information (e.g. 
24h from receiving this information) 
One trust routinely referred patients to community pharmacy for follow-up support with 
their medicines 
One practice pharmacist reengineered the process for action on discharge information 
All hospitals had policies for informing patients about their medicines Some practices use practice pharmacists to improve an expedite the processing of discharge 
information 
Heart failure nursing staff attempted to see patients before their discharge to talk about 
their medicines to avoid having these conversations rushed at discharge 
Community pharmacy is sometimes able to perform post-discharge Medicines Use Reviews 
for Patients 
In two trusts, ward-based pharmacists would speak to patients about their medicines 
before discharge  
Two hospital trusts run pharmacist-led titration clinics to manage patients' medicines, 
meaning that patients can be seen and followed-up quickly 
Patients received written information about their medicines, with one trust providing an 
easy-to-understand medicines chart occasionally annotated by staff  
Some practices have ambulatory services 
Patients are referred to specialist heart failure teams for follow-up Heart failure specialist nurses offer support services including medicines optimisation 
  
  Some GP practices have systems to identify discharged patients with high risk of being 
readmitted so they can take preventative action 
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Table 8:  Props at and after hospital discharge 
 At discharge After discharge 
Props Some staff create their own checklists to follow discharge processes, such as using the 
discharge summary to tick off medicines 
Patients create their own lists of medicines, going online to seek more information 
Staff occasionally give patients two copies of the discharge summary so that patients can 
give one to their GPs in case they do not receive it electronically 
Community pharmacists who have received a copy of the discharge summary use 
them to check against repeat prescriptions before dispensing 
Staff make ad-hoc queries to establish reasons for medicines changes which are unclear and 
undocumented so that they can be clear on the discharge summary 
Patients check medicines prescribed by their GPs against their discharge summary 
and/or take a copy when go see the GP or update them verbally 
Staff will delay discharge to wait for relatives to arrive so that they can include them in 
conversations about medicines 
GP identifying potentially problematic changes in medicines occurring in hospital due 
to their enhanced knowledge of the patient 
Ward pharmacists give advice to patients if they are concerned about patients getting 
confused, for example, advising them to return their old medicines to the pharmacy for 
disposal and only take the new ones 
GPs try to fill in patients' knowledge gaps about their medicines after discharge 
Patients write additional information on the medicines' boxes or ask staff to write it so that 
they can better manage their medicines at home, for example time to take medicines 
Community pharmacy provides emergency supply of medicines when patients are 
discharged from hospital without sufficient medicines  
Patients are sometimes cognisant of how difficult it is for patients to understand their 
medicines and information provided at discharge, so they take extra time to hold these 
conversations 
Patients are given telephone numbers for heart failure nurses to contact them after 
discharge because waiting times to be seen by them are long 
Staff draw curtains around the patients' beds when talking to them to ensure privacy and 
prevent interruptions  
Heart failure nurses can identify where patients make mistakes taking their 
medicines, for example, continuing to take discontinued medicines 
Nurses resist instructions to send patients to discharge lounges as they feel the staff will not 
have specialist knowledge, and provide enhanced instructions to discharge lounge if 
overruled 
Heart failure nurses use the patients as a conduit for information to be exchanged 
between them and other healthcare professionals 
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Junior doctors query with pharmacist on ward if they need additional information about 
medicines 
Patients develop individual strategies and routines to adhere to medicines at home, 
for example alarms, writing additional information in the discharge summary, storage 
systems, affixing discharge summaries on the fridge, etc 
  
Some patients take all their medicines to community pharmacy after discharge, 
seeking information on which medicines they should continue to take and which 
should be discarded 
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Discussion 
Notwithstanding a considerable body of research that has illuminated the sometimes 
alarming levels of preventable harm in healthcare systems and how this could be reduced,31 
32
 this study suggests that there are opportunities to enhance the system that manages 
medicines across multiple organisations. The study also provides a positive perspective on 
the strategies developed and actions taken by healthcare organisations, their staff, and 
patients to provide care successfully in the face of continued pressure and gaps that appear 
between and between organisations in this complex system.33 The multiple perspectives of 
patients and multidisciplinary staff, independent observation of practice and documentary 
analysis collected through mixed-methods allowed the possibility of triangulating data from 
multiple sources to offer a thorough description of a complex system. In doing so we also 
present a framework within which to explore and understand resilience in healthcare 
systems: that of ‘bridges’ and ‘props’ set against a backdrop of ‘gaps’ and ‘traps’. Moreover, 
this study explores a whole healthcare system inclusive of its transitions, to reveal the 
context of that system. In contrast, previous studies although adding to an understanding of 
system resilience, have examined these problems from solely a health professional 
perspective23 or a patient perspective.25   
 
Bridges and props either provided permanent system adaptations to potential gaps in care, 
or temporary fixes, usually implemented by individuals or small teams. Sometimes the props 
were put in place despite organisational pressure, for example to discharge patients and free 
beds. We also draw out the dissonance between what healthcare professionals believe 
should happen and the reality of contemporary practice. This was clear from the differences 
between the recommendations for hospital discharge from national guidance and local 
policy, where, for example, patients must be fully informed about their medicines and any 
changes, and the overall discharge process – which in the settings observed, may lack 
depth and the necessary detail, or appear rushed. This was sometimes due to different local 
conditions, such as the number of discharges that needed to be completed in a day, but also 
to local policies that lacked sufficient detail and were not supported by staff training. 
Healthcare systems are complex and non-linear and the Safety II paradigm asserts that 
success and failures are products of the same variable system performance and that linear 
models of events such as medication errors cannot reflect the complexity of modern 
healthcare systems.34 An enhanced view of the system using a Safety II lens allows 
healthcare organisations and policy-makers to understand and close the gap between work 
as imagined versus work as done.35 This view also provides a better understanding of how 
policies and guidelines are actually interpreted and whether they are implemented in 

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healthcare organisations by staff who adjust their performance to deliver care in a complex 
system.   
 
Resilient systems are able to learn from their clinical experience (both positive and negative, 
positive and negative), adapt to it and respond to provide successful outcomes.36 37 It was 
evident that staff were able to anticipate system vulnerabilities, for example in the transfer of 
discharge information, and take compensatory adaptive action in the form of ‘props’. As 
found by a previous study, patients also took remedial action, such as providing missing 
information about medicines changes to staff.25 Resilient systems can monitor, learn and 
anticipate opportunities to improve. A better understanding and acceptance of the error traps 
in the system present healthcare organisations with the opportunity to learn about how the 
system operates, particularly when it is under pressure and presents a basis to improve. A 
better knowledge of gaps allows staff to anticipate where problems may occur and take 
action to avoid them. Props in the system are indicators of how flexible staff and teams are 
and healthcare systems can learn from the temporary fixes put in place and knowing where 
bridges have successfully joined up care can help systems learn and be better placed to 
innovate elsewhere. There are opportunities to learn from the ‘ordinary performance 
adjustments’ that staff undertake to better understand how to keep patients safe, 37 thereby 
formalising system props into bridges. 
 
Implications for policy and practice 
Successive UK government-commissioned reports have highlighted how care systems have 
failed and how the actions – or inactions of those who lead or contribute to the system – 
have sometimes led to poor care and patient harm.38-40 Policymakers should recognise the 
attempts made routinely by healthcare professionals and teams to learn from  their clinical 
experience and apply this learning to increase system resilience by delivering safer care for 
patients despite disruptive conditions, such as disconnected communication systems, 
varying staffing levels and the under-provision of formal training, for example in discharge 
and care transfers. Our study has shown that improvements to both the efficiency and safety 
of care could be gained through connecting the discrete IT systems that operate within and 
between organisations. Additionally, community pharmacists often remain isolated from the 
patient pathway and are not routinely included in the communication between secondary 
care and primary care practice, creating additional risk for heart failure patients who must 
obtain new supplies of critical medicines often within one or two weeks of being discharged.4 
Implementing systems that enable community pharmacists to know about medicines 
changes made during hospital admissions and thus to reconcile subsequent GP 
prescriptions would improve safety of medicines management, especially for heart failure 


patients whose medicines are very commonly changed following a period of acute care. 
Local electronic systems do exist in a small number of areas to ensure that the dispensers of 
post-discharge medicines are fully informed about the medicines hospital clinicians intended 
patients should take so that they can reconcile those medicines and ensure accurate 
ongoing supplies.41 Policy makers also have a duty to help disseminate and promote 
implementation of these local innovations – such as the transfer of discharge medicines 
information to all agents in the medicines management system – which minimise inherent 
risk.  
 
Patients, if they so desire, should also be provided with the opportunity to gain in-depth 
knowledge of their medicines before leaving hospital (or afterwards if they prefer), in order to 
enhance their ability to self-manage and monitor their condition; such knowledge might also 
increase patients’ vigilance, their capacity for error detection, and therefore to ask for prompt 
support if medication problems arise. Materials to support patients should be developed 
using co-design methods to maximise their acceptability and usability with both patients and 
healthcare staff.42 Policy makers may also consider allowing patients to write to and share a 
personal health record to keep track of and flag problems they may have with their 
medicines, and share these with their healthcare teams and report them to their care 
providers.43 This would in some measure help address the underreporting of medication 
errors, particularly in primary care.44 
 
We found that staff received little formal training in co-ordinating medicines management, 
including in completing discharge summaries, and there was little evidence of inter-
professional or cross-pathway training. Such training may foster a care environment where 
clinical and administrative staff have a better appreciation of the impact of the care they 
provide on different parts of the system, and on different colleagues. For example, how 
inadequate information on a discharge summary can cause difficulties for primary care staff 
attempting to reconcile medicines. Additionally, in primary care, understanding that the 
processing of discharge information can impact on patients and community pharmacists who 
must take action to ensure the correct medicines are supplied. Inter-professional education 
has been found to yield positive outcomes in healthcare and may be especially helpful here, 
although more evidence for its effectiveness has been called for.45 
 
Implications for future research 
The Safety I paradigm produced valuable ways of unearthing and visualising risks within 
systems and explaining causation when accidents occur.32 In healthcare systems, Safety II 
can add substantially by focusing on how  safe care is delivered in the face of disruption and 


pressure by way of bridges, props or both, from individual, micro (e.g. healthcare teams) and 
macro (e.g. organisational) perspectives. Investigating further how this happens for different 
health conditions using tailored methodologies will allow a better understanding of safe, 
resilient care, and afford commissioners a view of how changes to services may impact on a 
complex system.46 
.  
Limitations 
We observed practice in four NHS Trusts and interviewed a wide-range of healthcare staff 
across the pathway and patients, alongside reviewing key documents, we did not include the 
perspectives of local, regional and national policy makers, which may have enhanced the 
understanding of how systems are designed and the gaps between design and delivery. 
Nevertheless we were able to collect a large amount of data to compare policy practice 
which enhanced reliability and validity. The patients and staff who agreed to be interviewed 
may have had particularly positive or negative experiences of the system, although their 
accounts were triangulated by first-hand independent observations. Finally, the study was 
conducted in four NHS healthcare economies, at a time of heightened focus on the quality of 
healthcare, and reports of unprecedented financial constraints, which may have impacted on 
people’s perspectives of care received and delivered, and on the nature of the care 
observed. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There are numerous opportunities for patient safety to be compromised and medicines to be 
sub-optimally managed during this care transition. However, there are also cross-
organisational bridges and temporary fixes in the form of props, put in place by individuals, 
including patients an carers, and teams to maximise the opportunity for safe and optimal 
care to be delivered.. Investigating gaps and traps in the healthcare system and identifying 
existing compensatory props and bridges allow the illustration of areas where healthcare can 
be improved and fragmented communication minimised during care transitions. 
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